Saudi Arabia Should Wait to Normalize Relations with Israel
Patience Will Allow the Kingdom to Gain Leverage Against Tehran
The euphoria surrounding a potential Saudi-Israeli normalization deal has never been more prevalent than it is today. Analysts are discussing the virtues of such a deal and what it will take to make it come into fruition. Will the Saudis get major concessions out of Washington? Will Saudi-Israeli economic ties outpace the unprecedented economic cooperation we are seeing between the UAE and Israel? And will the Palestinians receive any benefit to alleviate their present situation? All of these are important questions but what needs to be considered more than anything else is the timing of such a deal. Saudi Arabia needs to wait for the opportune moment in which to normalize relations with Israel in order to gain the maximum amount of benefit for itself, and more importantly from Washington’s perspective, to enhance regional stability.
Since the election of President Barack Obama, the United States has been signaling to its regional allies and partners that it wishes to drawback from the Middle East. During the Trump years, the administration was attempting to create a new order in the Middle East centered around Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Considering the new focus on ‘great power competition,’ Biden has continued to de-emphasize the region which has in turn incentivized regional powers to solve their own disputes without Washington. Already we have seen the rehabilitation of President Assad of Syria after a decade of brutal conflict, and even the winding down of the devasting war in Yemen. At the center of all of this is a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement which is aimed at lessening tensions between the two Persian Gulf powers. Saudi Arabia needs to continue to build on its new relationship with Tehran before it normalizes relations with Israel to gain maximum leverage against Iran in the event that Riyadh does decide to move forward with a deal with Jerusalem.
Consider Nixon’s opening of relations with China. Richard Nixon did not intend to normalize relations with China for its own sake but to promote global stability. He wanted to leverage the new relationship with China to enable an American withdrawal from Vietnam, advance arms control agreements with the Soviets and establish a new global equilibrium which included the Soviet Union and China as separate entities and not a Communist bloc. In order to succeed, Washington needed to get its timing right. If the United States had moved forward as soon as the Soviet Union and China ended their border war in 1969 it would have been difficult to build a relationship with the Soviets. The United States decided to engage in diplomacy with the Soviet Union first with the purpose of lessening tensions and then proceed to establish relations with China to extract concessions from Moscow. The results speak for themselves: America was able to withdraw from Vietnam, sign the SALT I and ABM Treaties, and put the Soviet Union on the backfoot for the remainder of the Cold War. The Saudis would do well to heed that lesson as it interacts with Israel and Iran.
By waiting to normalize relations with Israel, and focusing on its relationship with Iran, the Saudis can continue to reduce tensions in the Middle East. Once the Iranians have a stake in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to stabilize Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and other countries throughout the region, then Saudi Arabia should move forward with normalization with Israel. This will put the kingdom in a position to have maximum leverage vis-à-vis Iran and allow Saudi Arabia to establish itself as the new center of gravity in the Middle East. The Saudis will be able to use their new elevated position in the Middle East to promote regional stability and solidify their relationship with Washington. This is a unique opportunity, and the House of Saud should play its cards carefully.